Laboratory games and quantum behaviour : the normal form with a separable state space by Hammond, Peter J.
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s):  Peter J. Hammond 
 
Article Title: Laboratory Games and Quantum Behaviour :  
The Normal Form with a Separable State Space 
 
Year of publication:  2011 
 
Link to published article: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/
2011/twerp_969.pdf 
 
Publisher statement: None  
 
  
Laboratory Games and Quantum Behaviour:  
The Normal Form with a Separable State Space 
 
Peter J. Hammond 
 
No 969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
Laboratory Games and Quantum Behaviour:
The Normal Form with a Separable State Space
Peter J. Hammond∗
September 12, 2011
Abstract
The subjective expected utility (SEU) criterion is formulated for a particular four-person “labo-
ratory game” that a Bayesian rational decision maker plays with Nature, Chance, and an Experi-
menter who influences what quantum behaviour is observable by choosing an orthonormal basis
in a separable complex Hilbert space of latent variables. Nature chooses a state in this basis,
along with an observed data series governing Chance’s random choice of consequence. When
Gleason’s theorem holds, imposing quantum equivalence implies that the expected likelihood of
any data series w.r.t. prior beliefs equals the trace of the product of appropriate subjective density
and likelihood operators.
1 Introduction and Outline
1.1 Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under Quantum Uncertainty
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is a prominent example in quantum mechanics where observ-
ing one physical variable, such as a particular particle’s position vector, may preclude observing
simultaneously some other variable, such as the same particle’s momentum. Physical laws force a
choice between mutually exclusive experiments that can observe either the particle’s position, or its
momentum, but not both simultaneously. Similarly, in the two-slit laboratory experiment famously
discussed by Feynman (1951), any apparatus that detects which slit each particle in a stream passes
through will destroy whatever wave-like interference effects would otherwise have been observed.
The difficulties posed by such “weird” quantum behaviour have not deterred Deutsch (1999),
Pitowsky (2003) and various successors from seeking decision-theoretic foundations for quantum
probability. These include “quantum Bayesians” who have sought to extend Bayesian statistics to a
quantum setting.1 Much of this literature, however, limits itself to: (i) a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space of possible quantum states, which obviously excludes many important physical phenomena;
(ii) what economists call a “risk-neutral” agent, whose decisions maximize the subjective expecta-
tion of wealth rather than that of the utility of wealth. The latter SEU criterion, of course, is typical
in decision theory, and allows the agent’s preferences to be risk averse or even risk seeking.
There is a more serious obstacle in SEU theory, however, especially in what many of us regard
as a superior version due to Anscombe and Aumann (1963). First, the outcomes of what they call
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“roulette lotteries” have hypothetical “objective” probabilities attached to their outcomes, as in von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). By contrast, the outcomes of “horse lotteries” are given sub-
jective probabilities that depend on tastes, with ratios equal to the agent’s (constant) willingness to
exchange, contingent on different relevant events, shifts in objective probability away from any one
consequence toward a better alternative — see Hammond (1998b). Yet, like the hidden parameter
vector of any likelihood function in Bayesian statistics, quantum states are inherently latent variables
which can only be observed indirectly, at best. And it would be remarkably futile, of course, to place
bets on a horse race which is run in a fog so thick that no physical apparatus could possibly establish
its result.
This paper, accordingly, develops a Bayesian decision model that, when combined with Bayesian
statistics, may be able to meet the quantum Bayesians’ principal aims. To do so, it applies the SEU
hypothesis to a “laboratory” game in normal form that faces a decision maker with uncertainty
about: (i) quantum states belonging to a complex Hilbert space; (ii) observations in a space of
classical physical configurations.2 This framework is rich enough to accommodate many of the
stochastic quantum phenomena that physicists have been able to predict so precisely in experimental
settings. For now, we limit our analysis to a separable Hilbert space where operators have matrix
representations;3 non-separable Hilbert spaces rich enough to allow general “likelihood operators”,
whose spectral decompositions may require integrals instead of only sums, are left for later work.
1.2 Outline of Paper
Section 2 sets out a four-person “laboratory game”.4 Its first three players are the Decision Maker
(D), Nature (N), and Chance (C), who all have essential roles in any non-trivial game that is con-
sistent with the Anscombe–Aumann approach to subjective probability. But here they are joined by
a fourth player — an Experimenter (E) whose strategy, possibly in the form of a choice of physical
apparatus, determines (perhaps inadvertently) what data generating process (DGP) is postulated to
explain the observed result x of the experiment. In this setting, SEU theory requires player D to
have a subjective probability measure defined on an appropriate σ-algebra over the space of triples
(e, s, x) that combine: (i) playerE’s choice of experiment e; (ii) playerN’s choice, consistent with e,
of both a latent parameter vector s and data observation x. Though in principle player D’s subjec-
tive probability of any observable event could depend on which experiment e is used to detect its
presence or absence, we follow Vorob′ev (1962) in postulating that it does not.5
Following the discussion in section 2 of general experiments, the next section 3 specifies the lab-
oratory game in a quantum setting. Each state s chosen by Nature is identified with a “pure state” or
“wave function” which is represented by a latent stochastic parameter vector h in the unit sphere S
of a separable Hilbert space H over the complex field C. We assume that E’s choice of e, as inter-
preted by Nature, determines an orthonormal basis Ke ⊂ H, along with a compatible equivalence
relation ∼e of physical instinguishability defined on the multi-dimensional space of all possible ob-
servations x. Quantum theory, however, treats all the orthonormal subsets of H that have the same
closed linear span as one equivalent event with the same probability. Then the probabilities of dif-
ferent observations x can usually be calculated by applying the standard trace formula extension of
the Born squared modulus rule to the product of appropriate density and likelihood operators on H.
The final Section 4 contains concluding remarks and an agenda for further research.
2Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2008, 2010) consider partially ordered sets in a more general framework that
admits as a special case orthonormal subsets of (finite-dimensional) Hilbert space. La Mura (2009) limits himself to
“projective” expected utility on finite-dimensional Euclidean space.
3Recall that a topological space is separable if there is a countable subset whose closure is the whole space.
4There are key differences from the games considered by Shafer and Vovk (2001, pp. 189–191) or Pitowsky (2003).
5Hess and Philipp (2005) appear to have been first to realize how relevant Vorob′ev’s insufficiently appreciated work
is to quantum theory, though Pitowsky (1994) does note Boole’s (1862) related ideas from exactly 100 years earlier.
See also Khrennikov (2008). Somewhat similar ideas appear in work by Slavnov (2001) and by Janssens (2004), who
nevertheless seem unaware of Vorob′ev’s contribution.
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2 A Four-Person Laboratory Game
2.1 Players, Strategies, and Payoffs
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) limited themselves to decision problems with a finite set S of pos-
sible states s. Our laboratory game allows: (i) a more general Polish (i.e., complete and separable
metric) data space X , with its Borel σ-algebra B, whose typical element x is a time series that
describes in full the observed random result of the laboratory experiment; (ii) a second measurable
state space (S,S), whose typical element s is a latent variable parameter vector of the stochastic
process that, for each possible choice of laboratory experiment, generates the observed data outcome
x ∈ X . As usual in Bayesian statistics, the latent parameter vector s cannot be observed directly;
at best it can be inferred from x using Bayes’ rule to determine an updated posterior probability
distribution over S.
To avoid inessential measurability issues, we assume that the game involves a non-empty finite
set E of possible experiments, as well as a finite consequence domain Y . To avoid trivialities, we
assume that Y has at least two elements, one of which is definitely superior to the other.
We now consider a game with the following four players and their respective strategy sets:
Player D is a Decision Maker, who chooses a decision strategy or action a from a non-empty set A.
Player E is an Experimenter, who chooses an experiment e ∈ E that then determines a foursome
(∼e,Xe, Se,Se) consisting of: (i) an equivalence relation∼e of observational indistinguisha-
bility on X , which for each x ∈ X induces the information set [x]e ⊆ X as the unique
∼e-equivalence class that includes x; (ii) a corresponding sub-σ-algebra Xe of B on X , whose
members take the form ∪x∈B [x]e for some B ∈ B— that is, if x ∈ B ∈ Xe and x′ ∼e x, then
x′ ∈ B; (iii) an S-measurable subset Se ⊂ S of states relevant to the experiment e ∈ E; (iv) a
σ-algebra Se ⊆ S of measurable subsets of the relevant state space Se.
Player N is Nature, whose choice for each possible e ∈ E is modelled as the outcome (se, [x]e) of a
“horse lottery” which combines a latent state se ∈ Se with an equivalence class or information
set [x]e ⊂ X of observationally indistinguishable data series x ∈ X .
Player C is Chance, who, given the chosen experiment e ∈ E: (i) is informed of the pair (a, [x])
consisting of player D’s action a ∈ A, along with player N’s choice of equivalence class
[x] = [x]e ⊂ X; (ii) remains otherwise entirely uninformed about either the state s ∈ S
or the experiment e ∈ E; (iii) as a function of (a, x), sets up a “roulette lottery” Y 3 y 7→
λ(y; a, x) ∈ [0, 1] such that, for each fixed a ∈ A and y ∈ Y , there is an induced B-measurable
map X 3 x 7→ λ(y; a, x), which also satisfies λ(y; a, x′) = λ(y; a, x) for all x′ ∈ [x].
Note that this formulation allows Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, for example, to be respected
by having the variable equivalence relation ∼e treat either the position or the momentum vector of
a specific particle as unobservable. Furthermore, player D’s choice of action a ∈ A determines, in
effect, a bet that has to settled using only the observed outcome of any experiment.
To complete the description of the game, we must specify the four players’ payoff functions.
In fact players E, N and C will be treated as passive, meaning that their payoffs are arbitrary
constants, entirely independent of the game’s outcome. Player D’s preferences, on the other hand,
are assumed to concern only the random consequences y ∈ Y governed by the known probability
law (a, x, y) 7→ λ(y; a, x); in particular, they do not depend on the latent state s.
2.2 Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under Experimental Uncertainty
In the context of this laboratory game, standard SEU theory requires player D, our decision maker,
to have a unique triple consisting of:
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1. a Bayesian prior subjective probability measure6 F 3 F 7→ pi(F ) ∈ [0, 1] over the sample
space Ω := {(e, s, x) ∈ E×S×X | s ∈ Se} of triples describing playerE andN’s combined
strategy choices, where F denotes the σ-algebra of all sets F ⊆ Ω whose respective sections
Fe := {(s, x) ∈ Se ×X | (e, s, x) ∈ F} (1)
are Se ⊗Xe-measurable, for all e ∈ E;
2. a cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions (NMUFs) Y 3
y 7→ u(y) ∈ R;7
3. a preference ordering8 over A represented by the SEU function
A 3 a 7→ U(a) :=
∫
Ω
[∑
y∈Y
λ(y; a, x)u(y)
]
dpi (2)
for each NMUF u in the cardinal equivalence class.
Define E 3 e 7→ pe := pi({e} × Se × X) ∈ [0, 1] as the marginal probability density function
applying to player E’s choice of experiment e ∈ E. Then, given any e ∈ E with pe > 0, define
Se ⊗Xe 3 J 7→ qe(J) := pi({e} × J)/pe for all J ∈ Se ⊗Xe, (3)
thus making qe the conditional probability measure on Se ×X .
Let ∆(X,Xe) denote the set of probability measures on (X,Xe). Because (X,Xe) is Polish, the
prior probability measure F 3 F 7→ pi(F ) ∈ [0, 1] has values given by the composition
pi(F ) =
∑
e∈E
pe qe(Fe) =
∑
e∈E
pe
∫
Se
[∫
X
1F (e, s, x) `e(dx|s)
]
Pe(ds) (4)
where, given any e ∈ E with pe > 0, Nature randomly chooses a Bayesian probability system that
combines:
1. a state s ∈ Se according to a prior probability measure Pe(ds) on (Se,Se) satisfying Pe(G) =
pi({e} ×G×X)/pe for each G ∈ Se.
2. conditional on each s ∈ Se, an experimental outcome x ∈ X according to the data generating
process (DGP) or likelihood function Se 3 s 7→ `e(dx|s) ∈ ∆(X,Xe) that is Se-measurable
and satisfies ∫
Se
[∫
X
1J(s, x) `e(dx|s)
]
Pe(ds) = qe(J) for all J ∈ Se ⊗Xe. (5)
Then, for each fixed e ∈ E with pe > 0, the marginal ξe on (X,Xe) of qe is the probability measure
Xe 3 B 7→ ξe(B) := qe(Se ×B) =
∫
Se
`e(B|s)Pe(ds) (6)
whose value is the expected likelihood `e(B|s) of B ∈ Xe, given the prior Pe(ds) on (Se,Se).
Finally, each of playerD’s possible actions a ∈ A generates the unconditional roulette lottery
Y 3 y 7→ ηe(y; a) :=
∫
X
λ(y; a, x) ξe(dx) =
∫
Se
[∫
X
λ(y; a, x)`e(dx|s)
]
Pe(ds) (7)
6Note that pi is a countably additive probability measure, as in Arrow (1971) and Fishburn (1982). By contrast,
Savage (1954) derived only finitely additive probability, as do Gyntelberg and Hansen (2009) in the quantum context.
7Two NMUFs u, u˜ : Y → R are cardinally equivalent iff there exist both an additive constant α ∈ R and a positive
multiplicative constant γ ∈ R such that u˜(y) ≡ α+ γu(y) on Y .
8A preference ordering on A is a binary relation % on A that is complete and transitive. It is represented by the
utility function U : A→ R just in case U(a) ≥ U(a′) iff a % a′, for all a, a′ ∈ A.
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on Y whose conditional expected utility to playerD, given e ∈ E, is specified by the function
A 3 a 7→ Ve(a) :=
∑
y∈Y
ηe(y; a)u(y). (8)
This decomposition allows the SEU formula (2) to be rewritten as U(a) =
∑
e∈E peVe(a).
2.3 A Vorob′ev Consistent Probability System
As the experiment e ∈ E varies, the Bayesian structure set up in Section 2.2 places no restrictions at
all on inudced changes in: either (i) the subjective prior probability measure Se 3 G 7→ Pe(G) over
Se; or (ii) the Se-measurable DGP Se 3 s 7→ `e(dx|s) on (X,Xe). Yet presumably good experiments
should perturb both of these as little as possible. So, as e varies over E, only the domain (Se,Se)
and the σ-algebra Xe will be allowed to change. By contrast, the values of the probability measure
Se 3 G 7→ Pe(G) and of the DGP Se 3 s 7→ `e(dx|s) ∈ ∆(X,Xe) must both remain constant.
Formally, therefore, there must exist a probabilistic set function P : S∗ → [0, 1] defined on
the domain S∗ := ∪e∈ESe, along with a likelihood law (s, B) 7→ `(dx|s) ∈ [0, 1] defined on
∪e∈E(Se × Xe), both independent of e, such that for each e ∈ E, G ∈ Se, B ∈ Xe and s ∈ Se, the
pair (Pe, `e) satisfy the consistency conditions:
(i) Pe(G) = P (G); (ii) `e(B|s) = `(B|s); (iii) Se 3 s 7→ `(B|s) must be Se-measurable. (9)
These conditions require in particular that the various random data series x ∈ X which can be ob-
served in different experiments e ∈ E must all belong to overlapping probability spaces (X,Xe, ξ),
where only the σ-algebra Xe depends on e. That is, the collection
(X, {Xe}e∈E, ξ) (10)
must meet Vorob′ev’s (1962) definition of a consistent probability system.9
Note that the usual additivity condition ξ(B ∪B′) = ξ(B) + ξ(B′) needs to hold only if the two
sets B and B′ are not only disjoint Borel subsets of X , but also belong to the same σ-algebra Xe for
at least one common experiment e ∈ E.10 Furthermore, given any countable11 collection {Bn}n∈N
of pairwise disjoint Borel subsets of X , the usual countable additivity condition
ξ
(⋃
n∈N
Bn
)
=
∑
n∈N
ξ(Bn) (11)
must hold if there exists at least one experiment e ∈ E such that Bn ∈ Xe for all n ∈ N .
Finally, it is instructive to compare Vorob′ev consistency with a stronger condition for the exis-
tence of a Kolmogorov extension. The latter requires ξ to be defined throughout σ(B∗), the smallest
σ-algebra containing all the sets in B∗; this is typically much larger than the union B∗. Moreover,
(11) must hold for any collection {Bn}n∈N of pairwise disjoint subsets in σ(B∗).
3 Application to Quantum Experiments
3.1 Quantum States
In the quantum version of the game set out in Section 2, players D, E and C have exactly the same
strategy spaces. Moreover, there is still an arbitrary Polish space (X,B) of possible experimental
observations, with an indistinguishability relation ∼e on X and a corresponding σ-algebra Xe ⊂ B
9Discussing the obvious relationship to the quantum theoretic idea of context independence is deferred till later work.
10This is an obvious extension to σ-algebras of Griffiths’ (2003) “single-framework rule” for Boolean algebras.
11We regard any finite set as countable, as well as any countably infinite set.
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that both depend on the experiment e ∈ E. Furthermore, the random consequence y ∈ Y is still the
result of player C’s chosen roulette lottery, governed by the probability law (a, x, y) 7→ λ(y; a, x).
Now, however, there is a quantum state space (S,S) where: (i) S becomes the unit sphere S
of a particular physically relevant separable Hilbert space H over the complex field C;12 (ii) S is
the Borel σ-algebra on S generated by those of its subsets that are relatively open w.r.t. the norm
topology of H. Also, for each experiment e ∈ E, the measurable space (Se,Se) has its own special
structure that we shall now explain.
First, recall that a set G ⊂ H is orthonormal just in case the inner products of all its pairs
h, h′ ∈ G satisfy 〈h, h′〉 = δhh′ , where G × G 3 (h, h′) 7→ δhh′ ∈ {0, 1} is the Kronecker delta
function. Obviously, any orthonormal set G is linearly independent and a subset of S. When H has
finite dimension d, then #G ≤ d; in any case, separability of H implies that G is countable.13
Given any subset G ⊆ H (not necessarily orthonormal), let spG denote the closure in H of
the linear subspace spanned by G; it is also a linear subspace of H. An orthonormal set G ⊂
H is complete, or an orthonormal basis of H, if spG = H — i.e., for any h ∈ H, there exist
matching countable sets of basis elements {en}n∈N ⊂ G and of scalars {cn}n∈N ⊂ C such that
h =
∑
n∈N cnen, where the sum converges in Hilbert norm if N is infinite. Let G and K denote the
families of all orthonormal sets G and all orthonormal bases K, respectively, of the space H.
In our laboratory game, we follow Section 2.1 in supposing that player E’s choice of experiment
e ∈ E determines a foursome (∼e,Xe, Ke, 2Ke), but with the general set Se ⊂ S replaced by an
orthonormal basis Ke ∈ K, and with the σ-algebra Se replaced by the power set 2Ke . We derive
results, however, not just for a finite collection of foursomes (∼e,Xe, Ke, 2Ke) (e ∈ E), but for
arbitrary foursomes (∼,X , K, 2K), where ∼ is any equivalence relation partitioning X into Borel
measurable subsets that generate the σ-algebra X , and K ∈ K is any orthonormal basis of H with
2K as its power set.14 Reality constrains which of these foursomes are physically compatible, but
that is not really relevant for the mathematical structure of our purely decision-theoretic results.
3.2 Equivalent Quantum Events
The usual physical formulation of quantum mechanics (QM) represents uncertain latent events, not
as subsets whose members are latent vectors belonging to the unit sphere S of H, but as members
of the set L of all closed linear subspaces of H — or, equivalently, of the set P of all orthogonal
projections of H onto such subspaces. In our framework, this implies that QM imposes a quantum
equivalence relation Q∼ defined on the set G of all orthonormal subsets of H by
G
Q∼G′ ⇐⇒ spG = spG′. (12)
Thus, each orthonormal setG ⊂ S belongs to one equivalence class [G] of events, which corresponds
to the unique closed linear subspace spG ∈ L, as well as to the associated orthogonal projector
Π[G] ∈ P mapping H onto spG. In fact there are obvious bijections
[G]↔ sp[G]↔ Π[G] (13)
between the three spaces: (i) [G] := G/Q∼ of equivalence classes of orthonormal subsetsG ∈ G; (ii) L
of closed linear subspaces of H; and (iii) P of orthogonal projections onto closed subspaces in L. A
well known result of quantum logic is that L, or equivalently P, can be given an orthomodular lattice
structure. Then, for each fixed orthonormal basis K ∈ K, the family LK := {sp[G] | G ⊆ K}, or
its image PK under the bijection between L and P, is an orthocomplemented Boolean sublattice.
12The space H should be the domain of the relevant Hamiltonian energy operator that appears in the Schro¨dinger
wave equation. Using the complex field C, rather than the more intuitively appealing real field R, allows any solution of
this wave equation to be conveniently represented by means of unitary operators mapping S isometrically into itself.
13This is because any orthonormal basis is countable — see Friedman (1982, Lemma 6.4.7) for a concise proof.
14Equivalently, each K is a complete set of mutually orthogonal one-dimensional projectors, as in Caves, Fuchs and
Schack (2002) for the case when H is finite-dimensional.
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3.3 Quantum Prior Probabilities
Section 2.2 introduced, for each experiment e ∈ E, a Bayesian prior Pe on (Se,Se). In our quantum
context this becomes, for each orthonormal basis K ∈ K, a probability measure PK on (K, 2K).
Then, because the union ∪K∈K2K obviously equals the entire family G of all orthonormal subsets
of S, the consistency condition (i) of (9) implies that there must exist a probabilistic set function
P : G→ [0, 1] such that PK(G) = P (G) whenever G ⊆ K ∈ K.
Beside this first form of consistency, an obvious extra condition is quantum consistency, which
requires all quantum equivalent events in S to have equal probability, independent of which orthonor-
mal bases include them as subsets. Specifically, whenever two orthonormal sets G and G′ satisfy
[G] = [G′] because spG = spG′, we insist that P (G) = P (G′). Then the bijections (13) allow
us to define the two set functions L 3 L 7→ ν(L) ∈ [0, 1] and P 3 Π 7→ µ(Π) ∈ [0, 1] to satisfy
P (G) = ν(spG) = Π[G] whenever G ∈ [G] ∈ [G].
Suppose that {Πn}n∈N is any countable collection of pairwise orthogonal projectors — i.e.,
they satisfy ΠiΠj = 0 whenever i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. This is equivalent to their respective ranges
{Ln}n∈N being pairwise orthogonal closed subspaces of H. For each n ∈ N , let Gn be an or-
thonormal basis of the subspace Ln. Then the sets {Gn}n∈N are pairwise disjoint, and their union
G := ∪n∈NGn is also an orthonormal set. Note also that the orthogonal projection onto L := spG
satisfies Π[G] = ΠL =
∑
n∈N Πn. Hence, the mapping P 3 Π 7→ µ(Π) ∈ [0, 1] satisfies the
countable additivity condition
µ
(∑
n∈N
Πn
)
= µ(ΠL) = P (G) =
∑
n∈N
P (Gn) =
∑
n∈N
µ(Πn) (14)
whenever the projectors {Πn}n∈N are pairwise orthogonal. In particular, the triple (S,P, µ) suc-
cinctly summarizes any prior probability system {PK}K∈K that satisfies quantum consistency, as
well as consistency condition (i) of (9).
3.4 Quantum Likelihood Operators
Also in the quantum context, for each foursome (∼,X , K, 2K) specified in Section 3.1, we will
impose the consistency condition (ii) of (9) on the likelihood function of Section 2.2. The result is a
quantum likelihood law S 3 h 7→ `(dx|h) ∈ ∆(X,X ), which specifies how the conditional DGP
X 3 B 7→ `(B|h) changes as h varies over the whole of S.
Next, for each foursome (∼,X , K, 2K), consider the operator-valued set function
X 3 B 7→ LKX (B) :=
∑
e∈K
`(B|e) Π[{e}] (15)
whose value, for each B ∈ X , is a self-adjoint or Hermitean (linear) quantum likelihood operator
h 7→ LKX (B) h on H. Note that LKX (B) is a non-negatively weighted average of the orthogonal
family Π[{e}] (e ∈ K) of one-dimensional projectors onH, which implies that it is a positive operator
— i.e., 〈h, LKX (B) h〉 ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H. Finally, the countable range ΛKX (B) := ∪e∈K{`(B|e)} ⊆
[0, 1] of possible likelihood numbers must constitute the (pure point or discrete) spectrum of eigen-
values for the operator LKX (B). Indeed, each (real) eigenvalue r ∈ ΛKX (B) has its own eigenspace
sp ΓrKX (B), where Γ
r
KX (B) := {e ∈ K | `(B|e) = r}. Of course, eigenspaces associated with
distinct eigenvalues must be orthogonal.
For each foursome (∼,X , K, 2K) specified in Section 3.1, both the joint distribution qe defined
by (3) and its marginal ξe defined by (6) also have their quantum counterparts. For qe, it is the joint
probability measure qKX on the product (K, 2K)× (X,X ) given by
2K ⊗X 3 J 7→ qKX (J) =
∑
e∈K
[∫
X
1J(e, x) `(dx|e)
]
P ({e}) =
∑
e∈K
`(Je|e)P ({e}), (16)
7
where Je := {x ∈ X | (e, x) ∈ J} denotes the appropriate section of the set J , for each e ∈ K.
Following the pattern of (15), its operator equivalent is the set function defined by
2K ⊗Xe 3 J 7→ QKX (J) :=
∑
e∈K
`(Je|e) Π[{e}]. (17)
The counterpart of ξe is the probability measure ξKX on (X,X ) which, because of (16), is given by
X 3 B 7→ ξKX (B) = qKX (K ×B) =
∑
e∈K
`(B|e)P ({e}), (18)
whose operator equivalent, which again follows (15) because of (17), is given by
X 3 B 7→ ΞKX (B) := QKX (K ×B) =
∑
e∈K
`(B|e) Π[{e}]. (19)
3.5 Gleason’s Theorem and the Trace Formula
Let {en}n∈N be any orthonormal basis ofH. Then the trace of any positive self-adjoint operator ρ is
defined by tr ρ :=
∑
n∈N〈en, ρen〉 even if this sum of non-negative terms diverges to +∞; its value is
preserved by applying the same unitary transformation to all the vectors inH, which is equivalent to
changing its orthonormal basis. A density operator onH is any positive operator satisfying tr ρ = 1.
Suppose the separable spaceH has dimension d ≥ 3. By a corollary of Gleason’s (1957) theorem
due to Parthasarathy (1992, Theorem 9.18), the countable additivity condition (14) assures us that
there exists a density operator ρ satisfying µ(Π) = tr(ρΠ) for all projections Π ∈ P. This implies
the trace formula according to which, for every orthonormal set G ∈ G, one has
P (G) = µ(Π[G]) = tr(ρΠ[G]) =
∑
m∈M
tr(ρΠ[{hm}]) =
∑
m∈M
〈hm, ρhm〉 (20)
because Π[G] =
∑
m∈M Π[{hm}] for any orthonormal basis {hm}m∈M of G, and the trace is linear.
For each foursome (∼,X , K, 2K) specified in Section 3.1, analogous trace formulae also apply
to both the probability measure J 7→ qKX (J) defined by (16) and its marginalB 7→ ξKX (B) defined
by (18). Indeed, using (20) to substitute for each instance of the term P ({e}) in (16) gives
qKX (J) =
∑
e∈K
`(Je|e) tr(ρΠ[{e}]) = tr
(
ρ
∑
e∈K
`(Je|e)Π[{e}]
)
= tr[ρQKX (J)] (21)
because of (17). Using (18) and (21) with J = K ×B, then (19), yields the expected likelihood
ξKX (B) = qKX (K ×B) = tr[ρQKX (K ×B)] = tr[ρΞKX (B)] (22)
of any observable Borel set B ∈ X . It is the trace of the fixed density operator ρ — the quantum
equivalent of a Bayesian prior — multiplied by the appropriate quantum operator ΞKX (B). Finally,
for each action a, the quantum counterpart of (7) is the roulette lottery over consequences given by
Y 3 y 7→ ηKX (y; a) :=
∫
X
λ(y; a, x) ξKX (dx) = tr
[
ρ
∫
X
λ(y; a, x) ΞKX (dx)
]
. (23)
4 Concluding Summary and Research Agenda
In our laboratory game, player E’s choice of experiment e ∈ E gives rise to a physically compatible
pair consisting of an indistinguishability relation ∼e on the space X of possible observations, along
with an orthonormal basis Ke of a fixed complex separable Hilbert space H of quantum states.
Together these determine a range of possible subjective likelihood laws mapping the measurable
space (Ke, 2Ke) into probability measures on the ∼e-compatible σ-algebra Xe of X . When the trace
formula (20) holds, quantum consistency implies there is a density operator ρ on H which, just as
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quantum Bayesians claim it should, fully characterizes playerD’s prior subjective beliefs over every
orthonormal subset of H. Indeed, the trace formula multiplies the operator ρ by a subjective likeli-
hood operator to derive both: (i) the joint probability distribution over pairs consisting of quantum
states and experimentally observed data; (ii) the marginal distribution of observed data alone.
Since separable Hilbert spaces permit only operators with discrete spectra, one important tech-
nical task is to extend the analysis to non-separable spaces where likelihood operators can have a
much richer spectral decomposition consistent with continuous probability density functions.
More fundamentally, future work should consider extensive form laboratory games that explicitly
allow sequences of observations and/or decisions to be made at different times. Such games will
involve stochastic processes whose quantum state evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s wave equation;
this helps to motivate the otherwise rather counter-intuitive complex Hilbert space that quantum
theory always uses. Then too “normal form invariance” may allow SEU theory to be justified using
the “consequentialist perspective” of Hammond (1998a). Finally, considering extensive forms may
also further elucidate interpretational issues such as how Bayesian updating of density operators
relates to “collapsing” quantum states, as well as the vexing measurement problem.
For now, however, this paper has merely applied a standard Kolmogorov probability framework
to the special space of experiment/state/outcome triples (e, s, x) that was introduced in Section 2.2.
Then standard SEU theory, allied with Bayesian statistics, really is rich enough to analyse decision-
making under uncertainty about what quantum behaviour could be observed in an experiment — at
least when the quantum state space is separable. Nor is any special “quantum logic” needed beyond
a structured family of Boolean σ-algebras, as in Griffiths (2003). Note too that those complex-
valued latent variables, hitherto rather heavily disguised as “quantum probability amplitudes”, now
emerge as mere parameters of a subjective likelihood function defined over the relevant space of
possible experimental outcomes. Moreover, there is no reason why these observed outcomes should
be anything more obscure than data series in a space of entirely classical physical configurations.
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